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 The Independent Press after the “Moroccan Spring” 
 
Hamza Tayebi1 
Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah University, Faculty of Letters Dhar Mehraz 
Fez, Morocco 
 
 
 
Abstract: The wave of Arab Spring that started in Tunisia and Egypt arrived 
to Morocco in 2011 paving the way to unprecedented organized mass-protests 
all over the country. Among the demands raised by the 20 February 
Movement protesters was the demand for free and independent media outlets, 
especially the press. King Mohammed VI, the Commander of the Faithful and 
the highest authority in Morocco, promised in a televised speech on March 9th 
to introduce "radical" and "genuine" constitutional reforms that would 
democratize the country. In fact, King Mohammed VI has so far succeeded in 
calming down and co-opting the demonstrations, but journalists and political 
activists still get fined if they trespass the Hudud2. In my short article, I will 
briefly contextualize the Moroccan independent press and discuss its status 
after the "Moroccan Spring" with an attempt to show, through cases of 
imprisoned journalists, the contradictions associated with the liberalization of 
speech in Morocco. One of the main arguments of my article is that the 
democratization of the press could never be achieved as long as the public 
discourse that brings monarchical powers and actions into question is illegal. 
 
Key Words: Morocco, Independent Press, Moroccan Spring, 20 February 
Movement, Democratization, Red Lines, Liberalization of Speech 
 
 
The year of 2011, or more precisely the year of the Arab Spring, could be 
described as the tumultuous period in the modern history of the MENA region 
as it witnessed unprecedented and unexpected revolutionary protests that 
toppled many dictatorial and autocratic regimes like the Ben Ali regime in 
Tunisia and the Hussni Mubarak regime in Egypt. Television, cell phones, and 
internet-based social media did play a key role in spreading the mass-protests 
and in mobilizing new movements of social resistance in many countries, 
including Morocco. 
                                                          
1Hamza Tayebi is a Moroccan Ph.D. researcher in Cultural Studies and a part-time professor 
of English at Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah University, Faculty of Letters and Human 
Sciences Fez-Morocco. He is also an Executive Board Member in Takamul Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Studies and Research, Merrakech, Morocco. He is currently working in his 
Ph.D. thesis on Religion, Politics, and Print Media in Contemporary Morocco. Email him at: 
tayebi_hamza@hotmail.fr 
2Hudud is an Arabic word and it was used by the Moroccan well-known sociologist Fatima 
Mernissi in her book Dreams of Trespass and it means limits. 
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 In Morocco, the 20 February Movement3, being driven by uprisings and 
revolutions in other North African countries, not only protested against 
corruption, the absence of transparent elections, the high centralization of 
powers in the hand of the King, and the huge gap between the rich and the 
poor, but it also raised slogans calling for free and independent media outlets, 
especially the press, such as “Don’t touch the liberty of press and opinion”. 
Indeed, since Mohammed VI’s succession to the throne, Morocco has neither 
been officially described as a dictatorship nor as a democracy, but it has been 
claimed that the country is adopting the gradual shift towards democracy. 
While it is true that Morocco has already started the process of 
democratization, the actual problem is that almost all discussions or studies on 
democratization seldom give space to mass media. Rather, they routinely 
cover topics related to constitutional reforms and political parties. No one can 
deny the importance of the free independent press which is, as Azzedine 
Layachi notes in his State, Society, and Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of 
Associative Life, “an absolute necessity for a democratic environment in 
which an effective civil society can exist.”4 Milton, Locke, Madison, John 
Stuart Mill, and many other Classical liberal theorists strongly argue that free 
and independent media outlets can play a crucial and critical role in the 
democratization process. Edmund Burke's concept of the `fourth estate' has 
traditionally been regarded as one of the most efficient mechanisms of 
checks and balances.Indeed, not only does the independent press serve as a 
medium for civic associations to express their demands and objections, but it 
also serves as a tool in which to publicly question and evaluate the office 
holders and analyze their accountability. 
It is a universally acknowledged truth that liberalizing the press and mass 
media in general is the key to any shift to democracy. However, analyzing the 
liberalization of the press in Morocco, as Driss Maghraoui argues, is very 
complex because all the reforms that have taken place are contradictory. He 
argues here that the reforms do not follow a democratic transition paradigm 
and, thus, seek change while at the same time continue to preserve continuity.5 
It is also true that since the 1990s, and with the arrival of King Mohammed VI 
in 1999, more space has been open for debates in media. The independent 
press, in spite of the censorship and self-censorship phenomena, has recently 
experienced a slight broadening of its range of action. Nevertheless, even with 
the limited democratization of the press, journalists are only allowed to 
                                                          
3On February 20, 2011 this social movement started taking to the streets on a weekly basis 
asking for genuine and radical socio-economic and constitutional reforms in Morocco. The 
movement relied on the support of various organizations, unions, political parties and 
associations of different political colors (leftist, Islamist, Amazigh, student, and non-partisan 
people).  
4Azzedine Layachi, State, Society, and Democracy in Morocco: The Limits of Associative Life 
(Georgetown: Georgetown University press, 1998), p. 68.  
5Driss Maghraoui, “Introduction: Interpreting Reform in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics, 
12, N. 2 (July 2009), p. 144.  
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 evaluate “and criticize state actions, the political leaders' behavior (except the 
King and the royal family in general), as well as to analyze social, economic, 
and cultural issues.”6 Driss Maghraoui argues in this regard that 
 
 
 
 
Reforms have contributed to the enlargement of the space of 
political participation and provided better conditions for human 
rights, but they do not necessarily guarantee the rights of 
citizens to freely express their views. In Morocco, these rights 
stop when they reach […] what is popularly known as the 
'lignes rouges' or red lines. So the discourse about liberalization 
might be useful but the process is regularly faced by setbacks 
associated with the practice of fines against newspapers and 
occasional imprisonment of journalists.7 
 
 
 
 
Following Maghraoui's statement, reforms in Morocco have improved the 
conditions of human rights without broadening enough the space of freedom 
of expression; that is, journalists are still unable to freely shed light on 
sensitive issues, or on what is referred to as the red lines. If these red lines are 
transgressed, newspapers are shut down and journalists are fined. In fact, the 
setbacks in Morocco’s shift to liberalization and freedom that Driss Maghraoui 
talks about were noticed when interdictions and repressive measures started 
approximately one year after Mohammed VI’s succession to the throne. After 
his promise of tolerance and his emphasis on the phrase “the rule of law”, 
King Mohammed VI then “punctuated the subsequent debate in 2001 by 
stating that “journalists are not angels either” and that “Moroccan culture will 
triumph over imported models of free expression and opinion.”8 Andrew R. 
Smith and Fadoua Loudiy say here that “one of the first and most notable 
interdictions under Mohammed VI was the censorship of Le Journal when it 
attempted to publish a photograph of and interview with Mohammed 
Abdelaziz, the leader of the Polisario Front, which is seeking independence for 
Western Sahara.”9 Reporters Without Borders also “indicated thatin 2001 
the managing editor of Le Journal Hebdomadaire was sentenced to three 
monthsin jail and ordered to pay a fine of $200,000 for investigating 
                                                          
6Hamza Tayebi, “Print Journalism in Morocco: from the Pre-colonial Period to the Present 
Day,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 4, N. 6 (July 2013), p. 504.   
7Driss Maghraoui, “Introduction: Interpreting Reform in Morocco,” p. 145.  
8Andrew R. Smith and Fadoua Loudiy, “Testing the Red Lines: On the Liberalization of 
Speech in Morocco,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, (2005), p. 1083.   
9Andrew R. Smith and Fadoua Loudiy, “Testing the Red Lines: On the Liberalization of 
Speech in Morocco,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, (2005), p. 1083.   
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 allegations that the foreignminister misused public funds while serving as 
ambassador to the United States.”10 In fact, the political regime in Morocco 
seemed ready to reconcile with freedom of expression and with independence 
of media outlets when the opposition and socialist led government was elected 
to power in 1997. The new government, as Zaid Bouziame mentions in his 
“Moroccan Media in a Democratic Transition”, did lead a campaign with the 
aim to formulate a new press law that promised to enhance press freedom, but 
“since Mohammed VI's accession to the throne in 1999, and following the 
reform• of the press code in 2002, there was hope that radical reforms of 
Moroccan press laws• would take place, but such aspirations have not been 
fully realized.”11  
 Partisan newspapers do give a clear image about the lack of political 
perspective political parties suffer from in contemporary Morocco. 
Historically, exactly after independence from the French colonialism in 1956, 
the print press was mostly owned by political parties which were very critical 
and oppositional of the monarchy.12 Opposition leaders resorted to newspapers 
as the only weapons through which they articulated their challenges against 
the regime. Because of the regime’s tactics to coopt political parties of the 
opposition, especially the inclusion of the left-wing Socialist Union of Popular 
Forces (USFP) in 1998 and of the Islamist Justice and Development Party 
(PJD) in 2011, all political parties are now, according to Mohamed Daadaoui, 
unable, if not impotent, to mobilize society; accordingly, this “sets the 
monarchy above any political contests.”13 It is worth noting that the power 
political parties have lost is owing to the series of unexplainable splits that are, 
according to Mohammad Al-Tuzi, three kinds: splits arising from divisions, 
splits arising from separatist motivations, and arranged splits.14 Moroccans no 
more find trustworthiness in political parties in general, and in partisan papers 
in particular, and it is the independent press that has immeasurably grown in 
readership in Morocco. This is very clear today in Morocco seeing that the 
majority of people shun politics and political parties, let alone partisan 
newspapers. Following K. Kausch, many Moroccans are now very 
disappointed to see how former opposition parties have been all coopted by 
the political regime in the country.15 What is very astonishingly paradoxical is 
that “even the most prominent political figures in Morocco do not buy the 
                                                          
10 Zaid Bouzine, “Moroccan Media In A Democratic Transition,” Conference Papers: 
International Communication Association, (2009), p. 24. 
11Ibid., p. 12.  
12See Ahmed Ben Ashour’s Mass Media in Morocco, an unpublished Master’s thesis in the 
Institut Supérieur de Journalism defended in 1992, Rabat, Morocco.    
13Mohamed Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections 
as Positional Strategies,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 2, (2010), p. 196.     
14Mohammad al-Tuzi, “Reformers: Between Unity and Schism,” translated by Mohammed 
Bin Sheikh, Wijhat Nazar, Issue 2, (1999), pp. 4-5.   
15Kristina Kausch, “Elections 2007: The Most Transparent Status Quo in Moroccan History,” 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, (March 2008), p. 82.   
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 newspapers of the political parties to which they belong.” 16  Unlike 
independent newspapers, partisan ones are dependent on the financial 
assistantship from the government, and “this makes them state-regulated and 
with censorship hanging over them as the Sword of Damocles.” 17  This 
censorship on the public sphere hampers any political party from discussing 
freely political issues and societal ills. In this regard, Daadaoui strongly 
contends that 
 
 
The hegemony of the regime over the public sphere hinders the 
political parties’ ability to represent society and challenge the 
regime in a meaningful way, especially in policy making. 
Despite their lack of mobilizational capabilities and ideological 
clarity, political parties still regularly take part in limited 
elections and register their presence at a national level. The 
puzzle is why they participate when they know the rules of the 
game are set in advance to prevent any one party from 
dominating the political system, a system in which the regime 
enjoys strong religious legitimacy.18 
 
 
 
 
Naturally, political parties appeared to mobilize society and function freely 
in it in order to have an actual voice in any socio-cultural, economic, and 
political-making processes. Indeed, this would take place only if the Moroccan 
regime allowed these political parties to enjoy real legislative and executive 
authorities. In the absence of this, political parties, along with their 
newspapers of course, “will remain nothing but useless shells.”19  What is 
needed now in fact is the demakhzenisation of political parties in Morocco so 
that their newspapers in particular would be able to have a clear political 
perspective and, therefore, regain the trust of the population that has 
unfortunately been left with a big plume of disappointment and sadness 
lurking just beneath the surface. In the absence of a true independence of 
                                                          
16Hamza Tayebi, “Print Journalism in Morocco: from the Pre-colonial Period to the Present 
Day,” p. 503. 
17Ibid., p. 503. 
18Mohamed Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections 
as Positional Strategies,” Middle Eastern Studies, p. 207.   
19Drisse Jandari, “The Political Party Experience in Morocco: Obscurity and Policy Studies,” 
Case Studies of Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar, (March 2012), p. 
21. See the article online on http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/b723ee20-2e1a-499e-
b3ec-e1fc85809bb3.pdf. Accessed on May 24, 2015.      
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 political parties that are intended to mobilize citizens, it is more likely that the 
radical religious and ethnic groups will find it quite easy, especially with their 
ability to invest huge sums of money on mobilization, to fill the void. What is 
crystal clear now is that neither the state nor oppositional civil society activists 
wish to see this likely dramatic scenario occurring.              
 
The Human Rights Watch's 2011 report concludes that the Media outlets 
in Morocco, both print and online ones, criticize and investigate the 
government and its officials, but they still face harassment when they trespass 
certain lines which include criticism of the royal family in general, Islam, or 
Morocco’s claim on Western Sahara.20 What is very contradictory here is that 
the new Moroccan constitution, which was held on July 1, 2011 as a response 
to the periodic protests of 20 February Movement, guarantees freedom of 
expression, but the press law prohibits any criticism of the monarchy or any 
member of the royal family, Islam, and of the state’s position on status of the 
Western Sahara. This sort of contradictions makes the political landscape in 
Morocco very contradictory and characterized by a culture of passivity and 
followership that 20 February Movement protesters boldly revolted against. In 
this legal context, it is very difficult to envisage genuine democratization 
taking place in the country as long as the new constitution guarantees freedom 
of expression and the four board members of the High Authority for Audio-
Visual Communication are still monitoring content to ensure compliance with 
licensing requirements. Agatha Koprowski clearly concludes that “while the 
Constitution and other major laws officially support free speech and a free 
press, the system is easily manipulated so that its actual exercise becomes 
practically impossible.”21  
The question that is worth asking now in this regard is whether or not 
freedom of expression has been enlarged for independent journalists after the 
‘Moroccan Spring’. The cases of imprisonment of journalists along with the 
international non-governmental organizations’ reports on the press freedom in 
Morocco confirm that the status of the Moroccan independent press is 
unfortunately worse than it used to be during the two last years of King 
Hassan II’s reign. In fact, there are a multiplicity of cases and remarks through 
which this stance could be defended. 
First, many observers of the constitutional reforms that the Moroccan 
regime introduced in 2011 to calm down the protests concluded that this 
reform was not convincing due to the fact that Rachid Nini, the editor-in-chief 
of the first daily Moroccan newspaper in terms of circulation, Al Massae, was 
                                                          
20The Human Rights Watch's 2011 report, p. 87.   
21Agatha Koprowski, “Restrictions on the Press under King Mohammed VI and Morocco’s 
Obligations under International and Domestic Laws on Freedom of Expression,” Muslim 
World Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 7, Issue 2, (2011), p. 31.   
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 arrested in April 28th, 2011 after the publication of several articles criticizing 
the Moroccan security services’ abuses in the context of countering terrorism, 
including prison sentences handed down after unfair trials against Islamists.22 
Rachid Nini called also for increased political freedom and wrote several 
articles about corruption among government officials as well as about the 
involvement in corruption of weighty people close to the King. Here, the 
determination to continue delimiting public discourse clearly means, 
according to Moshe Gershovich, that the “attentiveness of the King to the 
public sentiment for change does not seem to have extended towards greater 
toleration of the media’s freedom to criticize sensitive issues.”23 In fact, many 
Moroccan independent newspapers like Al Massae, Akhbar Al Yawm, and Al 
Ayyam, to name but a few, attempt to sporadically transcend taboos and adopt 
an editorial line which is at least totally different for that of partisan 
newspapers whose chief editors and staff members are described now as “the 
Ultra-royalists”24 of the country (more royalist than the King). In other words, 
the strength of independent newspapers’ appeal to the reader does not solely 
lie, according to Aziz Douai, “in providing an alternative to the traditional 
partisan press, but actually lies in them assuming the role of a vibrant political 
opposition that the country currently lacks.”25   
  
Many other Moroccan journalists, like Mohammed Sokrat and Mustapha 
El Hassnaoui, have been imprisoned and badly treated in prison according to 
Amnesty International and many other international organizations. Sokrate, a 
prominent blogger, was arrested by security forces while leaving an Internet 
café in Marrakech. In June 2012, a local court sentenced him to two years in 
prison on charges of drug possession and trafficking, according to news 
reports; on the other hand, Mustapha El Hassnaoui was charged with terrorism 
on July 11, 2013 as he had had interviews with Jihadi groups in Syria.26 In 
                                                          
22For more information on the case of Rachid Nini, see the 2012 report of Freedom House that 
is published on https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2012/morocco#.VPuX09KG9i0. Accessed on March 8, 2015.  
23 Moshe Gershovich, “The “New Press” and Free Speech under Mohammed VI,” 
Contemporary Morocco: State, Politics and Civil Society under Mohammed VI, by Bruce 
Maddy-Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 105.  
24The Ultra-royalists (Ultraroyalistes in French, also called as Ultras) were a French political 
group active from 1815 to 1830 under the Bourbon Restoration. The Legitimists, another of 
the main right-wing families identified in René Rémond's classic opus Les Droites en France, 
were disparagingly classified with the Ultras after the 1830 July Revolution by the victors, 
the Orleanists, who deposed theBourbon dynasty for the more liberal king Louis-Philippe. 
Ultraroyalist also refers to "someone who is a very strong supporter of royalism." 
25Aziz Douai, “In Democracy’s Shadow: The ‘New’ Independent Press and the Limits of 
Media Reform in Morocco,” Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6.1, (2009), 
p. 21. 
26 For more information on the case of Mustapha El Hassnaoui, see 
http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/18417/maroc-justice-condamne-journaliste-quatre. 
Accessed on March 8, 2015.  
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 fact, these two journalists’ criticism of the Monarchy and its interpretations of 
Islam to gain legitimacy is widely believed to be the reason for their 
imprisonment. They also were both members of the February 20 Movement 
youth group, which had organized protests in 2011 calling for genuine reforms 
in Morocco and speaking against the centralization of power in the hand of the 
King. In his interesting Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and 
Enlightened Authoritarianism, Anouar Boukhars clearly concludes that the 
interior ministry will “actively seize any issue of any newspaper it reasonably 
deems as constituting an offense or a threat to the monarchy, Islam, territorial 
integrity, or the public order”.27 Another interesting case is that of the famous 
Moroccan brave journalist Fatima Ifriqui who has been best-known for her 
support to the demands of the February 20 Movement and who was harassed 
by a private phone call on March 28, 2013 threatening her to put her children 
in danger. Fatima Ifriqui joined the rallies organized by the February 20 
Movement on a regular basis and wrote many articles on Akhbar Alyawm and 
on Lakome.com severely criticizing the Makhzen28 and putting monarchical 
powers and actions into question. In order to protect her children, Fatima 
Ifriqui wrote an article in Arabic on Lakome.com and other websites and in 
which she bitterly apologizes for her decision to stop writing.29 
What makes matters worse in the contemporary Moroccan media 
landscape is that journalists are sometimes fined and being accused of 
contriving stories against ministers in the government, and Youssef Jajilli, the 
editor in chief of the investigative weekly Alaan Magazine, is a very good case 
in point. Jajilli published on a June 2012 issue an article in which he reports 
that Abdelkader Amara, minister of Manufacture and Trade in the “Islamist” 
government, ordered champagne to his hotel room while on a taxpayer-funded 
trip outside Morocco. This was undoubtedly too embarrassing to the ministry 
especially because the Islamist law does forbid Muslims from drinking 
alcohol. Freedom House reported on the imprisonment of Jajilli pointing out 
that Amara accused the journalist of inventing the story despite the fact that 
the latter published later “the hotel bill showing the charges for alcoholic 
beverages under the official’s name.” 30  In his interview with Amnesty 
International, Youssef Jajilli, who won Morocco’s prestigious National Press 
Award in 2011, says: “The current charges against me are politicized and are 
being used to try to silence my journalism and my magazine, I am not a 
criminal.  I am a journalist who has done nothing but fulfill my ultimate duty 
                                                          
27 Anouar Boukhares, Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened 
Authoritarianism (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 23.  
28The Makhzen was consolidated at the 17th century, and was initially used to collect taxes 
and to wage wars before becoming a synonym of the Moroccan bureaucratic and security 
apparatus.  
29See Fatima Ifriqui’s last article on http://pnnpress.com/?p=6053. Accessed on February 22, 
2015. 
30See https://freedomhouse.org/article/moroccan-government-charges-editor-criminal-
defamation#.VVKShtNViko. Accessed on May 12, 2015.  
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 which is to serve as a watchdog on the government and expose corruption, 
truth.”31 Youssef Jajilli was accused according to Article 52 of the Moroccan 
Press Law that clearly states that journalists can face up to one year in jail and 
fines of up to 100,000 dirhams (US$11,955) if convicted on defamation 
charges. Indeed, Jajilli was accused because he had published an article 
reporting on a Moroccan minister’s order of Champagne in a hotel room 
abroad, and this violation of freedom of speech clearly gives an idea of what 
may have happened to Jajilli if he had reported on the King or on any other 
member of the royal circle.   
Another topical case is that of Ali Anouzla, the editor-in-chief of the 
famous online newspaper Lakome, and who was arrested in April 2013 “after 
posting an article on the terrorist threat in Morocco which included a link to an 
al-Qaida video criticizing the wealth of King Mohammed VI and calling for 
an uprising.”32 Ali Anouzla is charged with providing material support to, and 
apologizing for, terrorism, but colleague, and long-term campaigner for 
freedom of speech, Aboubakr Jamaï, says that “The state is using all its 
resources to put an independent journalist in prison on horrific charges in 
order to destroy his reputation and that of Lakome.” Anouzla, along with the 
staff of Lakome, are known for their criticism of the King and of corruption 
within the royal entourage. The Guardian newspaper says in this respect that 
“Lakome is at the forefront of an expansion of online news media in Morocco, 
regularly falling foul of the authorities for its investigative journalism, which 
has covered the King's botched handling of the release of a Spanish pedophile 
from prison, his lavish holidays to France, and corruption among his inner 
circle.”33 What is very paradoxical is that Anouzla was arrested and charged 
with supporting terrorism despite the fact that he had clearly criticized the 
video of Al Qaeda, calling it propaganda. Indeed, all the international NGOs 
confirm that Anouzla was arrested because of his severe and open criticism of 
the monarchical actions and policies. He has recently been released on bail but 
continues to be investigated while Lakome.com remains censored by the 
authorities. Aboubakr Jamai says in this context that the harassment of 
Anouzla is but an attempt to “destroy an emerging business model” which is 
difficult to be controlled as is the case with traditional print media. In addition 
to that, Moroccan authorities “have also recently obstructed the registration of 
Freedom Now, a new press freedom NGO created by Moroccan human rights 
defenders and journalists, including Ali Anouzla.”34  There are many other 
serious cases like that of the Moroccan journalist Hamid El Mehdaoui, the 
                                                          
31See https://www.change.org/p/his-majesty-king-mohammad-vi-drop-the-criminal-
defamation-charges-against-youssef-jajili-2. Accessed on May 12, 2015.  
32See http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/27/morocco-amnesty-crackdown-freedom-
of-speech.  33Ibid., Accessed on June 1, 2014.  
34See http://www.amnesty.ca/news/news-releases/morocco-stop-using-
%E2%80%98terrorism%E2%80%99-as-a- pretext-to-imprison-journalists#.U3uzP86-
q6g.twitter. Accessed on June 1, 2014.   
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 chief-editor of the online newspaper badil, who has been harassed and 
summoned to court regularly under the pretext that he published false 
information about the death of a 20 February Movement activist in prison.35 
Badil is known of its criticism of the violations of human rights as well as the 
king’s actions and policies.   Therefore, claiming that the status of the 
independent press has improved and that the reforms and promises initiated in 
2011 represent a radical departure from the past would be utterly incorrect. 
The cases of harassment against independent journalists oblige us to 
discuss the political landscape in Morocco because media systems in the Arab 
world, as William Rugh stresses, cannot be understood without taking into 
consideration the specific political conditions prevailing the country36. Being 
the highest authority and the Commander of the Faithful in Morocco, the King 
does still reign and rule even after a referendum on constitutional reforms held 
in Morocco on July 1st, 2011 and that were reportedly approved by 98.49 % of 
voters, a notorious and predictable result in the Arab world. In spite of 
Mohammed VI’s rhetorical calls for embracing democracy, the reforms he has 
so far initiated do not display any genuine or decent end to democratize the 
political system, a system which seriously lacks any meaningful framework of 
checks and balances.  Unfortunately, the major powers, constitutionally 
speaking, are still in the hand of the King while the government still remains 
passive. Thierry Desrues argues here that the Moroccan Monarchy “has been 
afforded a monopoly over constituent power, supremacy over the 
representation of the nation, headship over the faithful and the role of 
protector of freedoms.”37 The Monarchy’s clear monopoly in the Moroccan 
political landscape stands in the way of any genuine democratization in the 
country, hence making the King and any other member of the royal family not 
subject to criticism or critical discussion on independent media outlets. Islam 
has been discussed on media outlets, especially on print and online 
newspapers, and many scriptures related to polygamy and inheritance are 
regularly brought to the surface by leftist and Islamist newspapers and 
magazines like Al Ahdath Al Maghribya, Assabil, Tel Quel and many others. 
However, the official interpretations of Islam are still taboos that independent 
journalists rarely cross due to the fact that Islam, as Mohamed Daadaoui 
points out, is “the supreme reference for a hierarchy of legitimation that has 
enabled makhzen to extend its hegemony over civil society and the political 
system in general.” 38  Therefore, questioning the official interpretations of 
                                                          
35For more information about the case of Hamid El Mehdaoui, see the recent report of 
Freedom Now NGO, p. 38. See the report online on http://www.fichier-
pdf.fr/2015/02/11/rapport/rapport.pdf. Accessed on March 8, 2015.  
36William A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics 
(USA: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. X. 
37Thierry Desrues, “Mobilizations in a Hybrid Regime: The 20th February Movement and the 
Moroccan Regime,” Current Sociology Monograoh, Vol. 61, N. 4 (2013), p. 414.  
38 Mohamed Daadaoui, Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining 
Makhzen Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 51. 
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 Islam, one of the mechanisms of regime survival in Morocco, is still 
prohibited. Journalists cannot question the state’s legitimacy in relation to 
Islam especially because the Moroccan press, as Aouar Boukhars stresses, is 
“still regulated by the main provisions of a Royal Dahir 39 , issued on 21 
November 1958” and “which was slightly amended in 1973 and 2002, but the 
changes have done nothing to reduce the vulnerability of the press to 
intentionally vague admonitions and ambiguous statutes.” 40  While the 
Moroccan media landscape is much better than in its neighboring countries, 
the incidents of harassment against independent journalists demonstrate its 
failure and lack of strategy in achieving a truly independent media.   
Another argument that I would attempt to hastily highlight here is that lack 
of freedom of expression might have been the reason behind the going tabloid 
attitude the majority of independent broadsheets in Morocco have adopted. 
My MA. dissertation defended in June 2013 was meant to investigate the trend 
towards tabloidization in Assabah and Al- Ahdath Al- Maghribya, two 
Moroccan independent newspapers. The conclusion reached after a content 
analysis on the aforementioned newspapers is that Moroccan broadsheets are 
massively adopting the features of yellow journalism or the features of 
tabloids. Here, the independent newspapers’ shift towards tabloidization41 is, 
in the first place, unethical because it erodes the conventional journalistic 
standards, and then ideological as it disengages people from the real social, 
political, economic, and cultural matters of society. Hence, the argument I am 
trying to problematize here is that the absence of freedom of expression in 
Morocco leaves newspapers’ chief-editors with no possibility to freely discuss 
politics in depth or to mushroom all information. To sell well, independent 
broadsheets have resorted to tabloidization, unethically superseding hard news 
with soft news.           
In the light of what has been pointed out, it would be safe to assume that 
Morocco has started the process of democratization, but the absence of 
freedom of expression, especially when it comes to the independent press, puts 
this process at stake and the reforms introduced thus far have been impugned. 
The argument I have been attempting to defend is that the democratization of 
                                                          
39Dahir means in English a decree-law. In Moroccan politics, a Dahir means a decree by the 
King of Morocco.  
40 Anouar Boukhares, Politics in Morocco: Executive Monarchy and Enlightened 
Authoritarianism, p. 23.  
41Tabloidization could be briefly defined as a contemporary shift of focus in journalism away 
from hard news and serious factual information and toward soft news and entertainment. In 
other terms, it first means an increase of less newsworthy elements in the news; second, it 
means that popular and tabloid elements of secondary importance in the news are consciously 
or unconsciously placed in the foreground and the news content increasingly deviates from its 
real source. Third, process of tabloidization of the news means less coverage of international 
stories, little attention to politics and the economy but more to human interest and 
entertainment news stories, sport, scandal, people’s private lives. 
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 the press could never be achieved as long as the public discourse that brings 
monarchical powers and actions into question is still illegal. What should be 
done now is the implementation of serious and effective measures to fight the 
country’s most precarious social issue, illiteracy, to enable Moroccans to 
understand and interact with the various discourses of media outlets. Nothing 
could actually justify the state’s regular imprisonment and financial penalties 
against journalists while the rate of illiteracy is still very high and a significant 
portion of Moroccans are too poor to afford the prices of newspapers, 
magazines, and the monthly Internet bills. Along with that, the Moroccan 
regime should take into account the post-Arab Spring people’s dreams and 
aspirations, and it is, therefore, expected to promote freedom of expression by 
establishing a genuine democratic environment with institutions able to 
function within a meaningful framework of checks and balances. As long as 
these things are not still prioritized by the Moroccan political system, 
Mohammed VI’s promise to support a free press will always be regarded as an 
empty rhetoric.   
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